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Introduction: The Politics of School District Turnaround 
 
Superintendents list politics as the top factor that impedes their job performance, according to a 
2015 American Association of School Administrators survey (Education Week, 2015). State 
interventions in low-performing schools and district turnaround efforts tend to be especially 
contentious, as demonstrated by public protest in such communities as New Orleans (Buras, 2015; 
Jabar, 2015), Memphis (Glazer & Egan, 2016), Newark (Russakoff, 2015), and even smaller 
Massachusetts cities such as Holyoke (Williams, 2015). At the same time, research suggests that 
the effective navigation of politics is a crucial component of successful and sustainable district 
improvement initiatives (Honig & Coburn, 2008; Johnson et al., 2015; Jochim, 2013; Stone, Henig, 
Jones & Pierannunzi, 2001). Unfortunately, the academic literature is short on guidance for leaders 
looking to implement politically viable district turnaround.  
 
Massachusetts’ takeover of the chronically low-performing Lawrence Public Schools (LPS) 
provides a rare case of a state-led district-wide turnaround leading to early positive academic 
outcomes for students while generating limited political controversy relative to more typical cases 
of turnaround. In a new working paper, I describe the factors that contributed to the way that key 
stakeholders in Lawrence—the general public, parents, educators, union leaders, and district 
partners—responded to the early reforms. In other words, I explored the question: why wasn’t the 
Lawrence turnaround more controversial? 
 
Context: Lawrence, Massachusetts  
 
Lawrence, a mid-sized industrial city about 30 miles north of Boston, is one of the most 
economically disadvantaged communities in the state. Leading up to the state’s takeover, the 
public school system served approximately 13,000 students. Roughly 90 per cent of students 
qualified for Free or Reduced Priced Lunch, and 80 percent were learning English as a second 
language. Many of Lawrence’s families came to Massachusetts from the Dominican Republic or 
Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, LPS students were scoring 0.70 standard deviations lower than the 
state average on both math and ELA standardized exams, and only about half of all students were 
graduating high school within four years. In the fall of 2011, the state responded by using 





districts at the lowest levels of performance. The state placed LPS into state “receivership” and 
appointed a “Receiver,” who was given wide authority to alter district-wide policy.  
 
The early turnaround strategy had five major components, including efforts to: (1) raise 
expectations for students and staff through ambitious performance targets, (2) increase school-
level autonomy and accountability, (3) improve the quality of human capital, through staff 
replacement, staff development, and a new performance-based career ladder compensation system, 
(4) increase learning time, through expanded school day, enrichment activities, tutoring, and 
special initiatives, and (5) use data to drive instructional improvement. The first two years of 
turnaround implementation led to substantial positive gains in math and modest improvements in 
ELA and high school grade progression (Schueler, Goodman & Deming, 2016).  
 
The Lawrence experience has not been without controversy, but this has been minimal when 
compared to more typical examples of takeover and turnaround. It helped that several local elected 
officials expressed public support for receivership before the state acted. Popular press coverage 
of the Lawrence schools shifted from a mostly negative tone pre-receivership to a more positive 
tone over the first two post-receivership years. The limited, existing polling data suggests no major 
signs of upset from parents or from retained teachers during the early phase of turnaround 
implementation. The most vocal criticism came from the Lawrence Teachers Union, which openly 
opposed the state takeover and had ongoing policy-based disagreements with turnaround leaders. 
However, district and union leaders agreed that union-district communication improved post-
receivership and that the union took a fundamentally cooperative, rather than oppositional, 
approach.  
 
Project and Methods  
 
To explore why the reforms were not met with more controversy, I held one-on-one interviews 
with a purposeful sample of 20 turnaround leaders and stakeholder group representatives. I 
supplemented the interview data with an analysis of news coverage of the Lawrence schools and 
publically available documents such as website content, case studies, public speeches, and minutes 
from public meetings. Interviewees included central office and state department of education 
officials, union leaders, elected officials, leaders of non-profit district partners, and a small number 
of principals and teachers. The educators were also purposefully sampled. Specifically, once my 
analysis of press coverage and survey data suggested there had been minimal resistance to the 
turnaround, I asked interviewees and other contacts to introduce me to participants who were 
known to have resisted the turnaround. The teachers in my sample came from this avenue of 
recruitment: they had been anti-receivership initially. My interview questions focused on public 
perceptions of the reforms and the factors that might have influenced the response. I coded the 
transcripts to identify major themes.  
 
Findings: Explaining the Stakeholder Response  
 
Three primary factors appeared to work together to limit the negative response and to increase 
support for the reforms, including features of the: (1) local Lawrence context, (2) broader statewide 





(1) Local Context  
 
Several characteristics of the local Lawrence context help explain the generally mild response. 
First, the general public had come to view the district and city leaders as guilty of chronic 
administrative dysfunction. The previous three superintendents had been fired for allegations of 
wrongdoing; the most recent superintendent had been accused of fraud and embezzlement; and the 
mayor was under campaign finance investigation. This had produced a lack of confidence in local 
capacity to turnaround the school system on its own, and a willingness to let the state come in. 
Second, the district’s manageable size of 30 schools allowed turnaround leaders to spend time 
building relationships throughout the system. Finally, student enrollment was increasing 
throughout the post-receivership period, which meant that turnaround leaders did not need to close 
schools or cut budgets. 
 
Several features of the organized labor landscape also worked to the turnaround leaders’ benefit. 
Massachusetts’ principals do not have the ability to collectively bargain, which allowed the 
Receiver’s team to replace nearly half of all principals within the first two years. In addition, two 
factors laid the groundwork for comity between the teachers’ union and the Receiver’s team: the 
union had long sought a better relationship with district leaders, and the Receiver’s team respected 
the union’s perceived role as a check on corruption in the pre-receivership era. Finally, the lack of 
a strong union-parent alliance hindered the union’s ability to effectively mobilize the community 
against receivership. 
 
(2) State Accountability Context  
 
The accountability context in Massachusetts contributed to the limited conflict over turnaround in 
Lawrence. Massachusetts’ Achievement Gap Act (2010) had given the state expanded authority to 
take over districts in cases of extreme underperformance. Under the terms of the Act, the powers 
of the Superintendent and the School Committee become vested in the state-appointed Receiver. 
The state also bestows new authorities to the Receiver, including the ability to suspend portions of 
the collective bargaining agreement and unilaterally extend the school day and year.  
 
This unique capacity worked to shield turnaround leaders from some local battles and improved 
the district’s ability to handle politically sensitive issues. State and district turnaround leaders 
claimed that these powers allowed them to recruit politically savvy district- and school-level 
leaders by offering them meaningful authority to bring about change. The state-given authority 
also provided crucial coverage for turnaround leaders to negotiate a union contract that would not 
have previously been accepted by the union. Under receivership, union leaders recognized that the 
Receiver could implement changes without their support. Furthermore, the vast nature of the 
Receiver’s authority allowed turnaround leaders to appear measured for not using the full extent 
of their powers. For instance, turnaround leaders often emphasized that, although they had the 
authority to do so, they did not require teachers to reapply for their jobs or convert schools into 
charters.  
 





Within this state and local context, I find five features of turnaround leaders’ approach that 
minimized potential resistance to their reforms. First, leaders placed a high priority on building 
relationships with stakeholders. This is amply illustrated by the turnaround team’s early 
information-gathering efforts, their intentional shift from a compliance- to a service-based 
approach to district-school relations, the creation of teacher leadership opportunities, frequent 
engagement with the teachers union, and the enlistment of community-based non-profit groups in 
providing enrichment activities. These efforts empowered stakeholders within Lawrence to help 
shape and even take some accountability for the reforms.  
 
Second, turnaround leaders implemented a differentiated approach to district-school relations, 
avoiding potential mismatches that could have created frustrations. For example, the district gave 
schools different levels of autonomy based on prior performance and perceived capacity. Rather 
than assuming all schools were in dire straights, turnaround leaders identified and publicly 
celebrated the educators at schools that had already been high-performing prior to receivership. 
The district also brought in outside partners to help schools adapt to their newfound autonomy 
with tailored support.  
 
The third factor was leaders’ use of “third way” framing and policy decisions. Traditionally, “third 
way” refers to a political position that reconciles, and even transcends, right- and left-wing political 
perspectives (Bobbio, 1997). Educational leaders have used the “third way” more broadly in 
describing efforts to avoid false dichotomies and to reconcile polarizing political disagreements. 
The Lawrence Receiver often characterized the national education community as one in the midst 
of a bipolar, ideological battle between proponents of market-based reforms, allied with charter 
school advocates, and proponents of more centralized systems of public schooling, allied with 
teachers unions. He argued that Lawrence, in contrast, subscribed to a third way by borrowing the 
best ideas from both camps.  
 
Beyond the rhetoric, the third way framework became evident in the turnaround team’s policy 
choices. Although most schools remained under district management, the Receiver handed over 
the operation of a small number of schools to a diverse range of groups, including charter school 
operators and the local teachers union. The schools that came under charter management retained 
neighborhood-based student assignments and a unionized teaching force. This was a politically 
useful decision, since it removed charter opponents’ primary concerns about charter schools. 
Providing the local union with the opportunity to lead a school gave the union a chance to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of their preferred turnaround strategies, such as teacher leadership 
teams, which helped improve overall union-district relations. A final example of the third way was 
the Receiver’s dual emphasis on lifting academic expectations and building students’ social and 
emotional skills through expanded enrichment offerings.   
 
Fourth, turnaround leaders made several strategic staffing decisions that mitigated resistance to 
some of the most controversial reforms – those that related to human capital, such as dismissals 
and the new performance-based contract. For instance, the Receiver retained, recruited and 
promoted staff members whose own attitudes aligned with the Receiver’s, preventing friction that 
might have occurred with team members who were critical of the turnaround approach. The team 
also retained and developed relationships, early on, with key insiders whose institutional 




own extended networks. The human capital decisions were by no means smooth sailing; in the 
first year of the turnaround, the Receiver dismissed about ten percent of the teaching force through 
a “Receiver’s Review” process that generated significant anxiety among educators and complaints 
from the union regarding overreach and lack of due process. Nevertheless, the response likely 
would have been much worse had the Receiver dismissed larger numbers of teachers or required 
all staff members to reapply for their positions. Finally, leaders improved the palatability of the 
new, performance-based compensation system by increasing pay across the board.  
 
The final factor that minimized conflict and generated support for the turnaround was the leaders’ 
focus on producing early results while minimizing disruption. The Receiver’s team prioritized 
programs they thought would produce immediate benefits for students, such as the Acceleration 
Academies, while simultaneously building out reforms geared toward longer-term improvement 
such as systems for increasing school-level autonomy and accountability. For the Acceleration 
Academy program, highly regarded teachers provided struggling students with targeted 
instruction, in a single subject, delivered in small groups of roughly ten, over weeklong vacation 
breaks. The Academies played a major role in producing positive first-year impacts (Schueler, 
Goodman, Deming, 2016). As anticipated, the strong first-year results helped to convince parents 
and educators that the reforms were beneficial and made it more difficult for critics to oppose the 
reforms. At the same time, the turnaround leaders avoided reforms, such as the creation of a school 
choice system, that they worried would create disruption and confusion for families without 




In sum, I find that three factors converged to minimize public resistance to the Lawrence 
turnaround model: particular characteristics of the local Lawrence context, the expanded powers 
granted to the state and Receiver through the state’s accountability system, and the turnaround 
leaders’ judicious use of those powers. There are several policy implications. First, the findings on 
the role of context suggest that the results may not be replicable in districts that are radically 
different from Lawrence, such as large urban districts with dwindling enrollment, a strong 
principals’ union and a strong parent-union alliance. At the same time, the findings may provide 
guidance for state leaders on the selection of districts most ripe for this type of reform.  
 
Second, my finding that the new authorities granted by the state’s accountability system played a 
role in limiting resistance raises important questions about the sustainability of reform if and when 
the state returns local control. The current Receiver has three years left on his contract, but the 
state’s Education Commissioner has begun to discuss an exit strategy. A lack of short-term outrage 
may not translate to durable support, and latent union, teacher, and parent concerns over issues 
such as compensation, extended learning time, non-renewals, teacher retention, excessive test 
prep, and disciplinary practices at charter-run schools, could build and create challenges for 
sustainability. Turnaround leaders would be wise to solidify support among those stakeholders 
whose influence would increase under a locally-governed system.  
 
Finally, the findings provide encouragement for state and district leaders who wish to create 
politically viable change. In a policy climate often characterized by polarization, Lawrence 




promote creative collaborations, devolved decision-making while increasing accountability, raised 
academic standards while bolstering extracurricular offerings, and empowered local stakeholders 
to take ownership over the reforms even within a system of state control. Lawrence’s third way 






Bobbio, N. (1997). Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (translated by Allan 
Cameron). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Buras, K. (2015). Charter Schools, Race, and Urban Space: Where the Market Meets Grassroots 
Resistance. New York, NY: Routledge.  
 
Education Week (2015). Superintendents love their jobs, but say politics and social media are 
impediments.  
 
Glazer, J. & Egan, C. (2016). The Tennessee Achievement School District: Race, history, and the 
dilemma of public engagement. Tennessee Consortium on Research, Evaluation, and 
Development. 
 
Honig, M. & Coburn, C. (2008). Evidence-based decision making in school district central offices: 
Toward a policy and research agenda. Educational Policy, 22(4), 578-608.  
 
Jabbar, H. (2015). Drenched in the past: The evolution of market-oriented reforms in New Orleans. 
Journal of Education Policy. 
 
Jochim, A. (2013). “A reform at risk? The political realities” in Frederick Hess and Michael 
McShane eds., Common Core meets education reform. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.  
 
Johnson, S.M., Marietta, G., Higgins, M., Mapp, K. & Grossman, A. (2015). Achieving coherence 
in district improvement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. 
 
Russakoff, D. (2015). The prize: Who’s in charge of America’s schools? New York, NY: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.   
 
Schueler, B., Goodman, J. & Deming, D. (2016). Can states take over and turn around school 
districts? Evidence from Lawrence, Massachusetts. NBER Working Paper No. 21895. 
 
Stone, C., Henig, J., Jones, B. & Pierannunzi, C. (2001). Building civic capacity: The politics of 
reforming urban schools. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
 
Williams, M. (2015). Holyoke High School student on protest. MassLive.com. 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/03/holyoke_high_school_student_on.html 
